by Camillo Giamundo and Fernanda Leoni

The effects of the sanctions it imposes will only extend to Brazilian tenders that involve funds provided by the sanctioning entity, so any general prohibition on participation based on such a sanction must be considered illegal and therefore open to judicial challenge.

Increasingly present in Brazilian tenders under article 42, §5 of Federal Law 8,666 of June 21, 1993¹, international financing of works and services brings a new scenario to the relationship between private parties and the Government, which come to comply with and be bound not only by the provisions of Brazilian legislation, with the contracting Public Administration, but also by those of the Financing Institution’s guidelines, failure to comply with which may also lead to sanctions by the latter.

It is therefore important to analyze the legal regime applicable to the sanctions system of international financing institutions, focusing on the rules established by the World Bank, especially to identify whether the effects of any sanctions imposed by such bodies may extend to tenders held in Brazil, with or without the use of international funds.

1. The sanctions regime applicable to the World Bank

Given its history and longevity² compared to other international financing institutions, as well as the importance of its role in financing projects in Brazil, it is necessary to analyze the sanctions regime applicable to the World Bank, with appropriate caveats where any other similar or equivalent institution is concerned.

It should be noted at the outset that the World Bank Group (The World Bank) is an international agency, complementary to and independent of the United Nations System which, although created to function as a support unit for an international financial system, today acts as an entity specializing in development assistance for countries in poverty³.

The World Bank currently operates through five different institutions⁴, each with specific strategies — although aligned with the group’s general guidelines — which can be summarized as follows:

• International Bank for Reconstruction and Development – “IBRD” (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development – “IBRD”): A global development cooperative responsible for providing loans, guarantees, risk management assistance and advisory services to countries considered “low income” or “developing”.
• International Development Association – “IDA” (The International Development Association – “IDA”): Also aims to assist “third world” countries, likewise seeking to combat poverty through credit, with the difference that it provides funds with longer financing terms and lower interest rates.
• International Finance Corporation – “IFC” (The International Finance Corporation – “IFC”): According to World Bank guidelines, this is the institution responsible for development projects focused on the private sector of partner countries.
• Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency – “MIGA” (The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency – “MIGA”): The institution responsible for promoting investment by offering guarantees to investors; it therefore does not deal directly with beneficiary countries, but with those interested in investing.
• International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes – “ICSID”): The World Bank’s international arbitration and mediation institution, specializing in disputes relating to investments offered by its institutions. It is the only World Bank body of which Brazil is not a member State.

Among these bodies, only the IBRD and IDA are more closely related to public procurement, as they finance, within their remit, strategic public contracts for national governments. In any case, it is worth noting that these bodies do not have their own and/or independent sanctions system, even when they are “parties” to the financing procedure.

Although the World Bank had exercised oversight and punitive functions in relation to contracts since 1996⁵, it was only with the 2006 reform that an internal sanctions body specialized in the matter was created, generically called the “Office of Suspension and Debarment” (Office of Suspension and Debarment – “OSD”), which acts as a first level or instance for imposing sanctions. The OSD is directly assisted by the Integrity Vice Presidency (Integrity Vice Presidency – “INT”), which is responsible for the investigative phase of administrative sanctions proceedings. Only after sufficient evidence of a sanctionable offense has been identified will INT refer the case to the OSD. This sanctions sphere also includes the World Bank Group Sanctions Board (World Bank Group Sanctions Board), made up of seven external judges, acting as a second-instance Administrative Tribunal or appellate review body.

The World Bank’s sanctions activity is governed by a comprehensive body of rules⁶, the main references being: (i) the World Bank Group Sanctioning Guidelines (World Bank Group Sanctioning Guidelines) of 1/1/11; (ii) the Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption in Program for Results Financing (Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption in Program for Results Financing) of 02/01/2012; (iii) the Policy on Sanctions for Fraud and Corruption (WBG Policy: Sanctions for Fraud and Corruption) of 06/13/2016; (iv) the Procedure on Sanctions Proceedings and Settlements in Bank Financed Projects (Bank Procedure: Sanctions Proceedings and Settlements in Bank Finance Projects) of 06/28/2016; and (v) the Directive on Sanctions for Fraud and Corruption in Bank Financed Projects (Bank Directive: Sanctions for Fraud and Corruption in Bank Financed Projects) of 06/28/2016.

Since these are complementary rules of equal hierarchy, there is no order of preference for applying their provisions, and the information discussed below will be duly referenced for later consultation or verification. As briefly explained, the World Bank’s sanctions system is concentrated in three main bodies (the “active subject”), whose structure and powers can be summarized in the following table⁷:

INT	SDO	Sanctions Board
– Investigate administrative offenses; – Initiate and participate in sanctions proceedings; – Conduct and enter into settlements with investigated parties.	– Assess cases at first instance, imposing temporary suspension, considering the defenses submitted and imposing sanctions, where appropriate; – Monitor compliance with applicable procedures.	– Act as second instance or appellate review body in cases considered by the SDO.

The characterization of the “passive subject” of the sanctions applicable by the World Bank is very broad⁸, including any entity or individual, public or private, that becomes involved in any of the administrative offenses generically described in the corresponding rules. What the guidelines show is a concern to protect morality and ethics in contracts and selection processes financed by the Bank.

Sanctionable offenses include practices characterized as fraud and corruption (fraudulent, corrupt, collusive and coercive practices), as well as cases in which the party is accused of obstructing World Bank investigations, each of these offenses being defined in the Guidelines⁹ as follows:

• Corrupt practice: Offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, directly or indirectly, anything of value to improperly influence the actions of another party;
• Fraudulent practice: Any act or omission, including misrepresentation, that knowingly or recklessly misleads or attempts to mislead a party to obtain a financial or other benefit or to avoid an obligation;
• Collusive practice: An arrangement between two or more parties designed to achieve an improper purpose, including improperly influencing the actions of another party;
• Coercive practice: Impairing or harming, or threatening to impair or harm, directly or indirectly, any party or the property of the party to improperly influence the actions of a party.
• Obstructive practice: Deliberately destroying, falsifying, altering or concealing evidence material to the investigation or making false statements to investigators in order to materially impede a Bank investigation.

Once evidence of any of these offenses has been identified, INT is responsible for conducting the investigation and possibly preparing the statement of accusations and evidence, the formal charging document sent to the SDO to actually start the sanctions proceedings¹⁰. Before that, if there is stronger evidence of an offense, INT may recommend the temporary suspension of the investigated party while the proceedings are conducted, which will be imposed by the Evaluation and Suspension Officer (Evaluation and Suspension Officer – “EO”). This preliminary suspension may be reversed at any time by the interested party through a reasoned request to the EO. If the EO concludes that the accusation is based on sufficient evidence of an offense, a notice of initiation of proceedings will be issued to the accused, with a copy of all accusations and respective evidence, as well as information about their temporary suspension as an entity/individual eligible for World Bank-financed contracts. The accused may contest the EO’s determination; failure to respond will result in recognition of its validity and the definitive imposition of the suspension (debarment). If contested, the matter is referred to the World Bank Sanctions Board, which may uphold or reverse the previous decision.

Where temporary (or interim) suspension is not recommended, the case is referred to the SDO, which acts similarly, imposing the sanction (if the offense is proven) or closing the proceedings (if there is insufficient evidence of the offense), with the same possibility of defense and subsequent review of the case by the World Bank Sanctions Board¹¹; at the end of the proceedings, the following sanctions may be imposed:

• Debarment with conditional release: The World Bank’s standard sanction is the temporary exclusion of the accused from the list of “eligible” parties for a set period, after which the interested party may request reinstatement, provided certain conditions are met, which generally involve creating and implementing an integrity plan;
• Plain debarment (plain vanilla): Applicable to companies that already have a well-designed integrity plan and whose offense has been shown to be isolated. In this case, once the sanction period has ended, the company automatically becomes eligible again, without having to meet any conditions;
• Conditional non-debarment: In this case, the party is not excluded from “eligible” status, provided it meets certain conditions within the period specified by the World Bank. If any condition is subsequently breached, debarment for a set period applies. This sanction is only adopted where it is shown that the party has taken measures indicating that its debarment is unnecessary;
• Letter of Reprimand: In accordance with proportionality, in less serious cases, the World Bank may send the party a simple warning; and
• Restitution: In specific situations, the party may be ordered to return the amounts received.

In applying any of these sanctions, the severity of the penalty takes into account¹²: (i) the seriousness of the conduct; (ii) the magnitude of the harm caused; (iii) the sanctioned party’s interference with the Bank’s investigation; (iv) the sanctioned party’s history of misconduct (which may even take into account sanctions imposed by other international institutions); (v) mitigating circumstances, such as cooperation with the Bank¹³; (vi) breach of the confidentiality of the sanctions proceedings; (vii) any period of ineligibility or suspension already served; and (viii) other factors deemed relevant.

Finally, regarding the effects of these sanctions, it should be noted that the Sanctions Board or SDO may limit them to a particular division or business unit of the entity, or extend them to the accused’s affiliates, understood as any individual or legal entity that controls, is controlled by or is under common control with the accused¹⁴. In addition, these sanctions are automatically transferred to the accused’s successors.

2. Extension of sanctions to other international financing institutions

Having understood the procedure adopted by the World Bank for imposing sanctions within its remit — which, for logical reasons, are limited to financing provided by the institution itself — it is necessary to assess the legal possibility of these sanctions having any cross-effect on procedures adopted by similar institutions.

Under Section III, item “B”, subitem 7, of the Policy on Sanctions for Fraud and Corruption, the World Bank may recognize and adopt debarment sanctions imposed by other financing institutions, in a “cross-debarment” procedure, described in the document as follows:

7. Cross-Debarment: The World Bank may recognize and enforce the debarment decisions of other multilateral development banks in accordance with the Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions dated 04/09/2010 (as amended, supplemented or revised from time to time with Board approval). The Board may, from time to time, authorize the addition of a multilateral development bank to the existing list of institutions whose debarment decisions the Bank generally cross-recognizes. Management decides whether the World Bank will recognize and enforce, in respect of each party, the debarment decision of other multilateral development banks in accordance with the Agreement. The sanctions system may also entertain sanctions proceedings based on debarment decisions relating to fraud and corruption in connection with World Bank corporate procurement¹⁵.

As the passage quoted indicates, the World Bank may adopt as valid the debarment decision of another financing institution — generically referred to as “multilateral development banks” — and thus cease to recognize the sanctioned party as eligible in its procedures. In addition, the procedure adopted by other institutions may serve as a kind of precedent or basis for a referral to open sanctions proceedings at the World Bank itself, which will use part or all of its elements as evidence.

The legal basis for cross-debarment is an agreement dated 4/9/10¹⁶, whose current signatories, in addition to the World Bank, are the Asian Development Bank (Asian Development Bank), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), the Inter-American Development Bank (Inter-American Development Bank) and the African Development Bank (African Development Bank). The instrument provides that the signatories use uniform definitions for characterizing sanctionable offenses, the applicable investigative procedures and the sanctions imposed — all described in the previous section.

Once part of the agreement, each participant is required to notify the other signatories of any debarment decision imposed, including in the notice: (i) the name of the sanctioned entity; (ii) the offense committed; and (iii) details of the terms of the sanction imposed.

To recognize the extension of the effects of this decision, each participating institution will assess the following criteria: (i) whether the decision was based, in whole or in part, on the actual commission of a sanctionable offense; (ii) whether the decision was published; (iii) whether the sanction period exceeds one year; (iv) whether the decision postdates the institution’s signing and accession to the agreement; (v) whether the decision was imposed within ten years of the offense; and (vi) whether the decision was imposed by another institution not party to the agreement.

The sanction period imposed by one institution does not bind the other signatories to the agreement, which may adopt the sanction, with or without modifications, or initiate their own proceedings resulting in sanctions concurrent with, consecutive to or subsequent to the penalty period already imposed.

Finally, it should be stressed that, although an institution may simply decline to follow a sanction decision imposed by another financing institution, if it considers the decision inconsistent it must notify the other signatories, preventing any party from breaching the terms of the agreement.

3. Extension of sanctions to the national sphere

Drawing on the considerations in the previous sections, it can be seen that sanctions imposed by the World Bank, although they may be transposed to other financing institutions and vice versa, have effects directed at whether or not the accused/sanctioned party is eligible for a project involving funds provided by the sanctioning entity itself.

In this regard, the Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works and Non-Consulting Services under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and Grants by World Bank Borrowers¹⁷ establish very broad participation of interested parties in financed projects, even preventing the Borrower — in this case, the contracting Administration — from limiting the participation of potential bidders in financed tenders. This lengthy passage of the document is worth quoting:

Eligibility

1.8 In order to foster competition, the Bank permits firms and individuals from all countries to offer goods, works and non-consulting services for Bank-financed projects. Any conditions for participation shall be limited to those that are essential to ensure the firm’s capability to fulfill the contract in question.

1.9 With respect to any contract to be financed in whole or in part by a Bank loan, the Bank does not permit a Borrower to deny participation in a procurement process or award of a contract to a firm for reasons unrelated to: (i) its capability and resources to successfully perform the contract or (ii) the conflict of interest situations referred to in paragraphs 1.6 and 1.7 above.

1.10 As exceptions to paragraphs 1.8 and 1.9:

(a) Firms of a country or goods manufactured in a country may be excluded if (i) as a matter of law or official regulation, the Borrower’s country prohibits commercial relations with that country, provided that the Bank is satisfied that such exclusion does not preclude effective competition for the supply of the goods, works or non-consulting services required, or (ii) by an act of compliance with a decision of the United Nations Security Council taken under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Borrower’s country prohibits any import of goods or payments to a particular country, person or entity. Where the Borrower’s country prohibits payments to a particular firm or for particular goods by such an act of compliance, that firm may be excluded.

(b) Government-owned enterprises or institutions in the Borrower’s country may participate in the Borrower’s country only if they can establish that they (i) are legally and financially autonomous, (ii) operate under commercial law and (iii) are not dependent agencies of the Borrower or Sub-borrower.

(c) A firm declared ineligible by the Bank in accordance with paragraph 1.16(d) of these Guidelines or in accordance with the World Bank Group’s anti-corruption policies and sanctions procedures shall be ineligible to be awarded a Bank-financed contract or benefit from a Bank-financed contract, financially or otherwise, during the period of time determined by the Bank¹⁸. (Emphasis added)

Under the general eligibility clause highlighted, individuals or legal entities sanctioned by the World Bank with debarment (which makes them ineligible) may not benefit in any way from contracts financed with this institution’s funds. Note that the restriction is considerably broad, encompassing the idea of “benefit”, financial or otherwise, to the interested party, which, depending on the interpretation adopted, implies a prohibition both on direct participation in the tender and on any subcontracting by the winning company.

It should be stressed, however, that the effects of any sanctions on Brazilian tenders financed by the Sanctioning Body will only be valid if, when imposed, the fundamental constitutional principles guiding the Brazilian legal system were observed.

This is because a sanction that failed to observe the principles of due process of law, adversarial proceedings and full defense, as well as the proportionality and reasonableness of the penalty in the specific case, cannot be considered valid. Marçal Justen Filho¹⁹ accordingly notes that the rules of international institutions can and should be applied provided that national sovereignty and the non-disposability of fundamental interests prevail.

In view of this, it can be said that the debarment sanction imposed by the World Bank may prevent the sanctioned party from participating, directly or indirectly, in any contracts involving funds provided by that institution, on whatever basis (loans, financing or other forms of credit), provided it is preceded by a series of procedures guaranteeing the interested party’s defense and respecting the fundamental guarantees set out in the Federal Constitution and the Brazilian legal system.

On the other hand, it is important to clarify that a sanction imposed by the World Bank, in principle, does not prevent the sanctioned party from participating in tenders financed with funds from other similar institutions, since cross-debarment, as explained in the previous section, is not automatic and depends on certain requirements being met. If the debarment sanction prevents the interested party from participating in tenders financed with international funds as defined above, this should not be the case in entirely domestic tenders, or even international tenders, that do not use any funds provided by such institutions.

This is because the general rule of Law 8,666/93 aims at broad participation by interested parties, in keeping with the principle of broad competitiveness, which prevents any restrictions not essentially related to ensuring the best proposal is obtained, as can be seen from article 3 of the law:

Art. 3^o. The purpose of the tender is to ensure compliance with the constitutional principle of equality, the selection of the proposal most advantageous to the administration and the promotion of sustainable national development, and it shall be processed and judged in strict accordance with the basic principles of legality, impersonality, morality, equality, publicity, administrative probity, adherence to the call for bids, objective evaluation and related principles.

• 1^o. Public officials are prohibited from:

I – admitting, providing for, including or tolerating, in calls for bids, clauses or conditions that compromise, restrict or frustrate their competitive nature, including in the case of cooperative societies, and that establish preferences or distinctions based on the bidders’ place of birth, headquarters or domicile or on any other circumstance irrelevant or immaterial to the specific object of the contract, except as provided in §§ 5^o to 12 of this article and in art. 3^o of Law n^o 8,248 of October 23, 1991;

II – establishing differentiated treatment of a commercial, legal, labor, social security or any other nature between Brazilian and foreign companies, including with regard to currency, method and place of payment, even when financing from international agencies is involved, except as provided in the following paragraph and in art. 3^o of Law n^o 8,248 of October 23, 1991.

As Celso Antonio Bandeira de Mello²⁰ teaches, tenders have a dual objective: to give government entities the opportunity to make the most advantageous deal and to ensure broad competition among bidders. In view of these objectives and the content of the legal provision above, the Procurement Law itself precisely established the cases in which the participation of interested parties may be restricted, relating to: (i) the express impediments in its article 9; and (ii) the qualification rules in its article 27 et seq. Bear in mind that, even in these cases, there was no intention to limit participation without any logical reason. On the contrary, in both situations there is a clear intention to ensure compliance with a principle considered the most relevant, as follows.

Article 9 of Law 8,666/93²¹, in setting out an exhaustive list of prohibitions/impediments to participation, essentially aims to ensure equality among interested parties, preventing bidders who may have improper access to information from gaining an advantage over others. The content of the legal provision leaves no doubt as to this purpose:

Art. 9^o. The following may not participate, directly or indirectly, in the tender or in the performance of the work or service and the supply of goods necessary for them:

I – the author of the basic or detailed design, whether an individual or legal entity;

II – a company, alone or in a consortium, responsible for preparing the basic or detailed design, or of which the author of the design is a director, manager, shareholder or holder of more than 5% (five percent) of the voting capital, or controlling shareholder, technical officer or subcontractor;

III – a civil servant or officer of the contracting body or entity or the person responsible for the tender.

• 1^o. The author of the design or the company referred to in item II of this article may participate in the tender for the work or service, or in its performance, as a consultant or technician, in oversight, supervision or management functions, exclusively in the service of the interested Administration.
• 2^o. The provisions of this article do not prevent the tendering or contracting of a work or service that includes the preparation of the detailed design as an obligation of the contractor or for a price previously set by the Administration.
• 3^o For the purposes of this article, indirect participation means the existence of any technical, commercial, economic, financial or labor relationship between the author of the design, whether an individual or legal entity, and the bidder or the party responsible for the services, supplies and works, including the supply of goods and services necessary for them.

The qualification rules, in turn, rather than preventing or limiting the participation of interested parties, aim to ensure a good contract, setting out sufficient conditions of legal qualification, tax and labor compliance, technical qualification and economic-financial qualification for the bidder to be considered fit to contract with the Government.

Since the interpretation of these rules is associated with the general principle of broad competitiveness, it is fair to say that prohibiting a bidder declared ineligible by the World Bank (or equivalent entities) from participating in tenders that do not involve any such financing, in addition to having no legal basis, would violate a series of constitutional principles and therefore cannot be considered legitimate.

Thus, what can be concluded from an analysis of the Federal Constitution, Brazilian legislation, the World Bank’s guidelines and even those of other international institutions is that the effects of the sanctions it imposes will only extend to Brazilian tenders that involve funds provided by the sanctioning entity, so any general prohibition on participation based on such a sanction must be considered illegal and therefore open to judicial challenge.

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1 Art. 42 (…) §5 For carrying out works, providing services or acquiring goods with funds from financing or donations from an official foreign cooperation agency or multilateral financial institution of which Brazil is a member, the respective tender may admit the conditions arising from international agreements, protocols, conventions or treaties approved by the National Congress, as well as the rules and procedures of those entities, including with regard to the criterion for selecting the proposal most advantageous to the Administration, which may include, in addition to price, other evaluation factors, provided they are required by those entities to obtain the financing or donation, do not conflict with the principle of objective evaluation and are the subject of a reasoned order by the body executing the contract, ratified by the immediately superior authority.

2 The World Bank was created on 12/27/1944 and is still considered today a benchmark international financing institution in relation to other equivalent entities.

3 In this regard, see click here. Accessed on 06/05/2019.

4 Internal Rules available at: click here. Accessed on 06/05/2019.

5 See: “A brief history of the sanctions regime”, contained in the Annex to the document “World Bank Group Sanctions Regime: An overview”. Available at: click here. Accessed on 05/20/2019.

6 Rules available at: click here. Accessed on 06/05/2019.

7 See Bank Directive: Sanctions for Fraud and Corruption in Bank Financed Projects.

8 See Section II, item “q”, of the document Bank Procedure: Sanctions Proceedings and Settlements in Bank Finance Projects.

9 See item 4 of the document Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption in Program for Results Financing.

10 The World Bank’s sanctions procedure is described in detail in the document Bank Procedure: Sanctions Proceedings and Settlements in Bank Finance Projects.

11 It should be noted that World Bank sanctions proceedings allow negotiations between the parties until a final decision is reached, and the interested party may cooperate to mitigate/avoid the applicable sanctions.

12 See Item 9.2 of the document Bank Procedure: Sanctions Proceedings and Settlements in Bank Financed Projects.

13 The World Bank has a Voluntary Disclosure Program (Voluntary Disclosure Program – “VDP”) for those not under investigation to report misconduct. As a benefit, the whistleblower will not be sanctioned for the conduct reported, nor will their identity be revealed to third parties.

14 See Section II, item “a”, of the document Bank Procedure: Sanctions Proceedings and Settlements in Bank Financed Projects.

15 Original text: “Cross-Debarment. The WBG may recognize and enforce the debarment decisions of other multilateral development banks in accordance with the Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions dated April 9, 2010 (as it may be amended, supplemented or otherwise revised with Board approval from time to time). The Board may, from time to time, authorize the addition of a particular multilateral development bank to the existing list of multilateral development banks whose debarment decisions the Bank generally recognizes for cross debarment. Management decides whether the WBG will recognize and enforce in respect of each particular debarment decision of such multilateral development banks in accordance with such Agreement. The Sanctions System may also entertain sanctions proceedings based on referrals of debarment decisions relating to fraud and corruption in connection with WBG corporate procurement”.

16 Available at: click here. Accessed on 05/21/2019.

17 Available at: click here. Accessed on 05/22/2019.

18 These same provisions appear in the Procurement Regulations for IPF Borrowers of July 2016; in the Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and Grants by World Bank Borrowers of January 2011; and in the standard bidding documents used by the World Bank, all available at the previous link.

19 JUSTEN FILHO, Marçal. Comentários à Lei de Licitações e Contratos Administrativos. 15th Edition. São Paulo: Dialética, 2012. p. 675.

20 BANDEIRA DE MELLO, Celso Antônio. Curso de Direito Administrativo. 27th Edition. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2010. P. 524.

21 Articles 38 and 44 of Federal Law 13,303/2016 (“State-Owned Companies Law”), although broader, have similar content, adapted to the legal nature of these institutions. The regulations issued by state-owned companies commonly reproduce these provisions.

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BANDEIRA DE MELLO, Celso Antônio. Curso de Direito Administrativo. 27th Edition. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2010. P. 524.

Bank Procedure: Sanctions Proceedings and Settlements in Bank Financed Projects, available at click here. Accessed on 06/05/2019.

JUSTEN FILHO, Marçal. Comentários à Lei de Licitações e Contratos Administrativos. 15th Edition. São Paulo: Dialética, 2012. p. 675.

Policies and Procedures of The World Bank, available at click here. Accessed on 06/05/2019.

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Article originally published on the Migalhas website (in Portuguese), on 06.12.2019.