The Judiciary’s credibility will not be rebuilt with defensive speeches or merely declaratory rules
The legitimacy of a Supreme Court is not built solely on the technical depth of its opinions or on the central institutional position it occupies in the constitutional design. Above all, it depends on public trust that its members decide with real and apparent independence, free from private interests, improper ties or gray areas capable of undermining the perception of impartiality. In mature democracies, this trust is not left to chance or to the individual virtue of judges: it is protected by clear rules of conduct, transparency and accountability. Brazil, however, remains an uncomfortable exception. The Federal Supreme Court (STF) still lacks its own structured and effective Code of Ethics or Conduct.
Recent events involving Banco Master brought this regulatory vacuum to the center of public debate. Controversial personal and financial relationships between individuals investigated for alleged billion-real frauds in the banking system and people close to STF justices placed the Court under intense scrutiny. The central problem does not necessarily lie in proving individual wrongdoing, but in a succession of situations that increase the risk of perceived conflicts of interest: shared trips, private invitations, proximity to interested parties and participation in events sponsored by parties with significant pending cases. In apex institutions, the appearance of independence is as important as independence itself. When that appearance weakens, institutional damage sets in quickly — and, once it does, it is hard to reverse.
This kind of erosion is not exclusive to Brazil. In the United States, the Supreme Court faced a similar crisis after reports revealed benefits, travel and hospitality funded by businesspeople with direct or indirect interests in the Court’s cases. The response came in 2023, with the adoption of a formal Code of Conduct, something unprecedented in the Court’s history. The initiative sought to reaffirm the principles of impartiality, prudence and independence, making it clear that justices should not allow others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence judicial decisions. Even so, the US experience highlighted a recurring dilemma: ethical rules without clear enforcement mechanisms tend to have limited, more symbolic than structural, effects.
Other democracies have made more consistent progress. In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court has adopted objective rules that directly address the most sensitive issues of contemporary judicial ethics. Gifts and donations are only acceptable when they raise no doubt about integrity or independence; amounts received from extrajudicial activities must be made public; and there is a cooling-off period after the end of the term, intended to reduce the risks associated with the so-called “revolving door” between public office and private interests. The same spirit guides the United Kingdom and France, where codes of conduct and ethics guides reinforce the idea that judges must avoid not only actual conflicts, but also situations that society could reasonably perceive as such.
It is no coincidence that countries consistently ranked among the least corrupt in the world in international perception indexes — such as Denmark, New Zealand and Singapore — have clear and specific ethical rules for the judiciary. In these systems, judicial integrity is treated as a permanent public policy, not as a presumed moral attribute. The common denominator is unequivocal: judicial ethics is an institutional system, not a private virtue.
In Brazil, a Code of Ethics for the National Judiciary, issued by the National Council of Justice, has existed since 2008. Although extensive and detailed, its practical effects have been limited, largely due to the lack of effective implementation tools and, above all, because it does not apply to the justices of the Federal Supreme Court. The result is a regulatory vacuum at the top of the Judiciary, precisely where power is greatest and where standards should be most rigorous.
It is in this context that the proposal to establish a specific code of conduct for members of the higher courts gains importance. The initiative follows an international trend and responds to a growing demand for ethical predictability, transparency and institutional protection. The aim is not to constrain justices or reduce judicial independence, but to protect the Court itself against avoidable erosion, by providing objective guidance for situations that currently remain in a gray area.
Practices that repeatedly undermine the credibility of constitutional courts are widely known. The work of spouses, children or close relatives at law firms handling significant cases before the higher courts, even if formally lawful, creates potential conflicts that are hard to justify to the public. In several countries, this kind of situation is addressed through strict preventive rules, including broader transparency duties, objective recusal grounds, removal from rapporteurships and, in certain cases, an express prohibition on relatives acting in cases pending before the court itself or before the courts immediately below it. Measures of this kind are not punitive but protective: they aim to shield the institution and its members from permanent suspicion.
The same applies to accepting invitations, paid speaking engagements, travel or hospitality paid for by interested parties, as well as to the lack of clarity about income earned outside judicial duties. In corporate compliance, such situations are treated as classic conflict-of-interest risks and addressed through strict disclosure policies, segregation of duties, objective limits on outside compensation and proportionate sanctions. There is no reason for the apex of the Judiciary to operate under less demanding standards than those required of executives, board members and managers of large public and private organizations.
The discussion about sanctions tends to cause discomfort, but it is unavoidable. Judicial independence is not the same as a lack of accountability. On the contrary: the greater the power concentrated in an institution, the greater the demand for transparency and accountability should be.
Comparative experience shows that sanctions are complex but feasible. They may range from formal warnings, temporary restrictions on rapporteurships, limits on participation in certain cases and enhanced transparency measures to proportionate financial penalties and, in more serious cases, impacts on salaries or ancillary benefits. The goal is not to punish for the sake of punishing, but to create real incentives for compliance and to discourage conduct that endangers institutional credibility.
The creation of ethics bodies with a preventive and advisory role, inspired by successful international experiences, also deserves attention. Ethics councils with a diverse composition — bringing together judges from different levels and independent experts in applied ethics — can serve as forums for advice, interpretation and prevention, reducing the risk of misconduct before it turns into a public crisis. This model reinforces the logic of contemporary compliance: prevention is always more efficient than remediation.
Finally, there is an element of institutional leadership that cannot be ignored. In governance, people speak of the “tone from the top”: the behavior of leadership sets the cultural standard for the entire organization. As the highest level of the Judiciary, the Federal Supreme Court exerts normative and symbolic influence over the entire judiciary. If the court that interprets the Constitution does not submit to verifiable standards of integrity, it loses the moral authority to demand exemplary conduct from others. An effective Code of Ethics, therefore, does not weaken the Court; on the contrary, it protects its justices, preserves the institution and strengthens democracy.
The Judiciary’s credibility will not be rebuilt with defensive speeches or merely declaratory rules. It is consolidated through clear rules, applicable to all, accompanied by real enforcement mechanisms. A Code of Ethics for the STF, if taken seriously, can become true infrastructure of trust. If it is merely symbolic, it will deepen skepticism. In times of institutional erosion, it is not enough for integrity to exist: it must be visible, unequivocal and verifiable.
